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THE POLITICS OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE PERUVIAN 
AMAZON RAINFOREST
Karen Konkoly
Introduction
 In the Peruvian Amazon rainforest 
reside 1,816 species of birds; 25,000 species of 
plants; 515 species of mammals; and 3 million 
people (Gamboa; “Geography, Agriculture…”). 
Maintaining the rainforest is crucial for 
ecological diversity, for carbon retention, 
as a basis for fair and equitable economic 
development of the communities living there, 
and for its potential to increase GDP. Yet, profit-
oriented large-scale development interests 
endanger the forest by opening up land to 
destruction from small-scale agriculture. 
Peruvian Amazonia is replete with natural 
resources that should be utilized sustainably 
with benefits flowing to local communities. 
 In this article, I examine the current 
politics of land usage and how issues 
contribute to deforestation. After discussing 
legislative concerns, I examine ways for Peru 
to maintain and improve economic growth 
to equitably benefit communities in the 
Amazon. To effectively counter deforestation, 
Peru should align priorities across interest 
groups and effectively allocate resources to 
subnational governments so that policies can 
play out as they are intended. Because small-
scale agriculture constitutes the majority 
of deforestation and is especially prevalent 
in the northern Amazon basin, I propose a 
sustainable alternative industry in that region 
with the potential to benefit both small farmers 
and the agricultural sector. By developing a 
cohesive, collective wisdom about the value of 
the rainforest, Peru can work toward a holistic 
forest policy that accounts for all these factors. 
Background 
 As of 2014, the Peruvian Amazon 
rainforest spans 69 million hectares, covering 
60 percent of Peru’s total land area (Piu and 
Menton). Although Peru historically has had 
lower rates of deforestation than neighboring 
countries like Brazil, deforestation has 
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accelerated in recent years. Between 2001 
and 2014, 1.65 million hectares of forest have 
been lost (Piu and Menton). According to 
Peru’s Forestry and Wildlife Law of 2011 (Law 
No. 27308, Article 7), it is illegal to engage 
in any activity that affects forest coverage on 
land deemed most suitable for maintaining 
standing forest (“Deforestation…,” p. 8). 
However, profit-oriented companies are 
often the ones funding land classification, 
resulting in primary forest areas classified as 
suitable for agriculture or other development 
projects and thus deforested. Moreover, weak 
law enforcement enables illegal developers 
in the logging, mining, and agricultural 
industries to pursue deforesting projects that 
further segment the rainforest. In total, both 
government-approved and illegal development 
projects are responsible for less than half of the 
damage. Most deforestation is due to small-
scale migrant farming. From 2000 to 2009, 
for instance, about 75 percent of the forest 
cleared was on plots of one-half hectare or less 
(Gutierrez-Velez and MacDicken). 
 Small-scale farming creates such a 
large impact because it is common for small 
farmers to migrate, slashing and burning 
small plots of land every three to five years 
to raise subsistence crops for their families. 
There is some disagreement about the factors 
underlying slash-and-burn forestry. According 
to Ravikumar and colleagues (p. 3), much slash-
and-burn forestry is a traditional, sustainable 
form of agriculture cyclic agroforestry, which 
involves growing a sequence of ground and tree 
crops and then letting fields lay fallow every 
few decades to regain fertility. The prevailing 
view, however, is that in recent years a majority 
of small farmers are landless migrants, often 
seeking refuge from the even greater poverty 
in Peru’s mountain regions. The population 
influx to the jungle means that fallow fields 
cannot adequately rejuvenate before the next 
migrants move in, perpetuating the slash-and-
burn cycle (“Conservation…”). To fund other 
necessities, many of these farmers grow cash 
crops, like coca,1 or partake in smaller-scale 
illegal logging or mining operations. 
 Although small-scale farming leads 
 1Coca is the main ingredient in cocaine, of which Peru 
is a leading producer. 
directly to the most hectares of forest cleared, 
migrant farmers often slash and burn near 
areas of the jungle already segmented by larger 
deforesting projects. From 1999 to 2005, for 
instance, three-fourths of all deforestation 
and forest degradation occurred within 20 
km of a road (Piu and Menton, p. 12). In 
general, the Peruvian government views the 
lack of infrastructure in rainforest areas as 
an obstacle to development. Agricultural, 
mining, private, and other interests push for 
development projects to maximize economic 
gain without prioritizing the environmental 
upkeep to sustain those industries in the long 
run. These deforesting development projects 
can occur legally because of the legislative 
ambiguity surrounding land classification and 
in turn open up areas for further small-scale 
agricultural deforestation. 
Land Classification 
 Currently, the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MINAGRI) is in charge of classifying land 
through a process called best land use capacity 
(BLUC). BLUC classifications determine 
whether land is most productive when used 
for various types of cultivation, forestry, or 
protection (“Deforestation…,” p. 8). However, 
BLUC assessments are based on the “climactic 
and soil characteristics” of land, without 
necessarily considering whether that land 
is currently covered by rainforest. Thus, if 
a forested area is deemed most suitable for 
cultivation, it could be sold as a concession to 
a plantation developer and deforested. BLUC 
assessments are subject to bias, often funded 
by the very companies pursuing development 
projects, and few subnational governments 
have the resources to verify their accuracy 
(“Deforestation…,” p. 4). In this way, Peru’s 
government condones deforesting projects like 
mining and agricultural plantations.
 The Peruvian Ministry of the 
Environment (MINAM) has a different agenda, 
establishing several policies in hopes of 
achieving zero net deforestation by 2020. In 
the time since MINAM was created in 2008, 
the agency has implemented a more thorough 
process, zonificación ecológica económica 
(ecological and economic zoning [ZEE]), to 
classify forestlands as suitable for economic 
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activity or conservation. Theoretically, 
MINAM develops ZEE plans in coordination 
with regional governments, and only already 
deforested regions are allotted for agricultural 
or mining projects. In practice, however, 
ZEE plans are subordinate to the BLUC 
classification procedure. MINAM’s lack of 
power relative to other government sectors 
prevents environmental concerns from getting 
adequate consideration in land use decisions. 
These conflicting policies at the national level 
are inherited by subnational governments that 
are ill equipped to deal with them (Gustafsson). 
Without adequate human and financial 
resources at the subnational level, regions are 
also susceptible to illegal deforestation from 
logging, gold mining, and other industries. To 
understand how these issues play out, I examine 
the current ownership and management of 
Peru’s rainforest land. 
Current Land Usage
 Approximately 20 percent of the rainforest 
in Peru is owned by communities or reserved 
for indigenous populations, who generally 
seek to keep the forest intact. Nearly all the 
remaining forestland is owned by the Peruvian 
national government. Protected areas account 
for about 26 percent of the rainforest; and, 
although protected areas can be vulnerable 
to illegal deforesting activities, in general 
they have much lower rates of deforestation. 
Another 23 percent of the rainforest is classified 
as “production forest,” sold as concessions for 
logging, non-timber forest products (NTFPs), 
ecotourism, and other economic activities. 
Much of the remaining forest area, around 22 
percent of the total, remains uncategorized. 
Uncategorized lands suffer disproportionately 
high rates of deforestation from small-scale 
agriculture, accounting for about 44 percent 
of total deforestation, because there is no 
single entity officially responsible for their 
care (Kowler et al., p. 8). Further deforestation 
is imminent if these lands are classified as 
suitable for agriculture, because not included 
in these figures are the 690,515 hectares 
of already deforested land currently used 
for agriculture (Kowler et al., p. 7). Most 
unclassified lands should be preserved, titled to 
local communities, or classified for ecologically 
friendly forms of forest production, like 
sustainable NTFP extraction (discussed later). 
 Much unclassified land is concentrated 
in the northern region of Loreto and other 
remote areas lacking studies to determine 
BLUC assessments. Although large-scale 
deforestation is relatively rare in Loreto, the 
region nevertheless experiences a significant 
amount of total deforestation. For example, in 
2010–2011, Loreto suffered more deforestation 
than any other region in Peru, about 36,200 
hectares of forest (Piu and Menton, p. 9). 
The deforestation problem on remaining 
unclassified lands suggests that it is important 
to complete land classification as quickly 
as possible, but under the current political 
atmosphere, completing land classification 
will not be enough. Even if all the remaining 
land were classified, legal deforestation 
would continue. In the next section, I discuss 
how legislative ambiguity creates a political 
environment that promotes large-scale 
deforestation and problems that subnational 
governments inherit. 
Problems with Decentralization
 On the surface, Peru’s regional 
governments seem like influential 
institutions. Peru is divided into 25 regions, 
which are further divided into two levels of 
local government: provinces and districts. 
According to the Decentralization Law (Law 
No. 27783) passed in 2002, provinces and 
districts share responsibility for environmental 
protection and conservation (OECD, p. 150). 
Regional governments grant land rights and 
concessions, thereby authorizing changes of 
land use, approving forest management plans, 
and ensuring that national forest policies 
are followed (Gustafsson). Theoretically, 
regional and national governments also 
share responsibility for promoting productive 
employment at all levels and for management 
and regulation of economic activities like 
agriculture and tourism (OECD, p. 150). 
 In practice, subnational governments 
are limited in their ability to carry out their 
responsibilities. In part, this is because the 
different national sectors of government 
lack coordination. For example, the Regional 
Government Law (Law No. 27867, Article 
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53) states that regional governments under 
the supervision of MINAM coordinate with 
local governments to perform ordenamiento 
territorial (territorial planning/land use 
planning [OT]). Combining ZEE and OT 
in theory would create a cohesive process 
that accounts for environmental, economic, 
and social impacts before classifying land. 
Provincial governments under the supervision 
of the Ministry of Housing, however, are 
responsible for a process similar to OT, called 
territorial conditioning, which often is not 
coordinated with ZEE-OT; yet, they are charged 
with determining land use at the district 
level. Complicating matters further, it is not 
uncommon for these sectors of the government, 
as well as for the different local governments 
within a region, to use different databases and 
spatial information when creating their plans. 
Finally, regardless of what conclusions OT and 
conditioning lead to, their decisions come 
second to other financial interests. If a private 
company can get the land classified through 
BLUC as best used for agriculture, then MINAM 
and regional governments can do little to stop 
the resultant development and deforestation 
(Gustafsson). 
Legislative Loopholes 
 Recent controversy in the agriculture 
industry provides an illustration of how these 
problems play out. Despite the export value 
created by agricultural plantation products, 
Peruvian national policy prohibits granting 
agricultural concessions in regions of healthy 
forest. Even agroforestry plantations that 
are theoretically better at preventing soil 
degradation can still create devastating 
consequences for biodiversity. Thus, 
agricultural concessions are to be granted only 
in areas already heavily degraded or deforested. 
However, some plantation developers purchase 
concessions from local governments in regions 
that are supposedly deforested but actually 
contain expanses of primary forest. Others are 
so deterred by the concession process that they 
ignore it and start clearing fields for plantations 
illegally. By the time Peruvian officials reach 
plantations in these remote areas of the jungle, 
it is often unclear whether plantation owners 
cleared the land illegally or whether it had 
been deforested beforehand. 
 One such plantation was developed 
in the northern region of Loreto by Cacao 
del Perú Norte,2 a division of the Cayman 
Islands–based company United Cacao. United 
Cacao claimed to use a sustainable planting 
strategy, developing plantations only in areas 
already heavily degraded and thus suitable for 
agriculture (Cannon). In reality, the company 
chopped down more than 2,000 hectares 
of primary forest between 2012 and 2014, 
creating tensions with indigenous groups who 
occupied the land (Finer et al.). In 2014, the 
Peruvian government ordered United Cacao 
to stop developing the plantation because 
the surrounding land and water resources 
were suffering and significant amounts 
of greenhouse gasses were being released 
(Cannon). The next year, Peruvian courts ruled 
that United Cacao was acting legally because it 
claimed that it only cultivated lands that were 
already degraded, thus most appropriate for 
agriculture. Satellite studies confirmed that 
the plantations were indeed developed in areas 
no more degraded than any average stretch of 
rainforest, with about 98 percent of forest cover 
still intact (Finer and Novoa, 2015). Companies 
like United Cacao have used this loophole of 
classifying nearly intact forest as suitable for 
agriculture to get away with clearing hundreds 
of hectares of primary forest. Although 
representatives from MINAM are trying to 
complete environmental studies satisfactorily 
before plantation development begins, as of 
March 2016, adequate enforcement of these 
policies was lacking. United Cacao continued 
to cut down primary forest, arguing that its 
method of cacao production was sustainable 
and expecting the public to forget that the 
eradicated forest had been healthy and 
longstanding (Erickson-Davis).
 Like the communities affected by Cacao 
del Perú Norte, many Amazonian residents have 
suffered the consequences of unclear forestry 
legislation. Although indigenous populations 
and other communities currently manage 
approximately 20 percent of forested land, 
they occupy much more. In 2009, indigenous 
peoples’ dissatisfaction worsened when 
 2Peru is a leading producer of cacao, the main 
ingredient in chocolate.
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President Alan García bypassed the legislative 
process to make a free trade agreement with 
the United States. This agreement aimed to 
boost the economy, restructuring land rights 
in the jungle to make more land available for 
foreign oil, mining, and livestock investment 
opportunities. However, the agreement’s open-
ended forest protection clause essentially 
consisted of each party promising to try its 
best to protect the environment. This loose 
legislation resulted in primary forestlands 
once controlled by indigenous populations 
auctioned off to foreign investors (Barrera-
Hernánez). 
Improving the System
 To address problems like illegal clearing 
and indigenous peoples’ dissatisfaction that 
are created by legislative ambiguity, territorial 
governments are pressuring the national 
government to pass a central ZEE-OT law. 
This law would unify the current policies 
surrounding land use, requiring decisions to be 
made from a political process that recognizes 
the differing priorities of subnational and 
national governments and then comes to 
a solution. Naturally, mining, agricultural, 
and private interests are opposed; thus, ZEE-
OT plans continue to be non-binding and 
have limited power to determine how land is 
used (Kowler et al., p. xii). Nevertheless, the 
Peruvian government has made multiple efforts 
to integrate the priorities of different sectors. 
In 2011, Peru created the National Center 
for Strategic Planning (CEPLAN) to improve 
decentralized planning and coordination 
between sectors. Unfortunately, CEPLAN lacks 
the resources to successfully moderate all the 
interests of different sectors and subnational 
governments. At the subnational level, Peru 
has sought to increase coordination by creating 
regional environmental commissions (CARs) 
and local environmental commissions (CAMs). 
Although intended to promote coordination 
between private and public stakeholders and 
civil society organizations, CARs and CAMs have 
limited effectiveness. In one study, community 
members from Madre de Dios, Ucayali, and San 
Martín said that their CARs did not meet often 
and lacked a diverse array of actors, specifically 
in the mining and agricultural sectors (Kowler 
et al., p. 41). 
 Although tensions between conflicting 
interests of different sectors are inevitable, 
Peru needs a clearer division of power at the 
national level and a better working relationship 
between government sectors. By passing 
unified legislation that details the process 
for land allocation and prioritizes ZEE-OT 
over BLUC classification decisions, Peru can 
move past the conflicting rulings of different 
sectors. Such a process involves strengthening 
coordinating bodies like CEPLAN, CARs, 
and CAMs and guaranteeing that all relevant 
sectors are participating. Finally, it should 
enable and require all these actors to use one 
unified database system when weighing in on 
land use decisions. 
 Collectively, political efforts to 
reduce deforesting development projects 
will have a minimal impact on reducing 
overall deforestation. In relative terms, the 
implications of these projects are what lead 
to most deforestation. Large-scale clearing, 
especially when done without benefits flowing 
to Amazonian inhabitants, opens up forestland 
to the small-scale agriculture that accounts for 
60 to 75 percent of deforestation (Ravikumar et 
al.; Gutierrez-Velez and MacDicken). Thus, it is 
essential for Peru to restrict extensive further 
expansion while allowing agricultural, private, 
mining, and other interests to profit as much 
as possible. Because small-scale agriculture 
results in the most deforestation, in the 
next section I make a case for an alternative, 
sustainable industry.
Sustainable Alternatives 
 The government of Peru is on board with 
alternative development options to counter 
deforestation from small-scale agriculture, 
especially that resulting from migrants’ 
dependence on illegal coca production. From 
2007 to 2011, Peru steadily increased funding 
for alternative development and counter-
narcotics programs. However, each year the 
amount of funding used has significantly lagged 
behind the total amount of funding allocated. 
For example, in 2010, more than $30 million 
was allocated for alternative development and 
counter-narcotics programs, but less than 
$20 million was spent. This gap suggests that 
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Peru’s National Commission for Development 
and Life Without Drugs (DEVIDA), along with 
regional and local governments, requires 
targeted technical assistance to effectively 
utilize funding (United States Agency for 
International Development/Peru, p. 23). 
The abundance of funding allocated for 
alternative development should in part be 
used to ensure that DEVIDA and subnational 
governments have the capacity to use their 
funding to complete alternative development 
projects. Although many current alternative 
development projects promote cultivating 
agroforestry crops like coffee and cacao, some 
experts suggest that harvesting naturally 
occurring tree crops can be an even more 
economically and environmentally beneficial 
alternative. Because the northern region of 
Loreto is especially affected by deforestation 
from small-scale farmers, I discuss an example 
of how forest products produced by the jungle 
in Loreto can provide a sustainable alternative. 
 Loreto is a vast lowland river basin 
containing an abundance of forest fruits, seeds, 
and other tree products, many of which are 
already harvested for small-scale consumption 
or are useful in medicinal remedies and 
cosmetics. A few of these NTFPs have become 
widely popular, much to the benefit of the 
forests where they originated. The palm fruit 
agauje, for instance, already plays a key role in 
sustaining the communities around Iquitos, a 
city in Loreto. There, between 20 and 50 tons of 
fruit are consumed daily (Smith and Venegas; 
Bloudoff-Indelicato). 
 Because aguaje and many other NTFPs 
perish so quickly, they are primarily consumed 
in cities close to where they are harvested. 
However, if companies were to invest in 
strategic processing facilities, such as in boats 
that sail along the rivers to visit communities, 
NTFPs could reach the growing international 
market for sustainably sourced goods. When 
a fruit can be identified as already popular 
within the local community, can be produced 
or harvested sustainably on a large scale, 
and has outstanding nutritional or flavor 
qualities, it is sometimes called a “Cinderella 
fruit,” demonstrating potential to be the next 
supermarket success. For example, consider 
the açaí industry in Brazil. Although the 
nutritious açaí berry had been a staple of the 
Brazilian Amazonian diet for centuries, it 
was perishable within a day, thus little known 
elsewhere. In the 1990s, when producers 
discovered that the berry held its outstanding 
nutritious qualities if frozen and sold as pulp, 
it gained popularity throughout the U.S. and 
Europe. The industry now employs more than 
30,000 people in Brazil, and much of the açaí is 
wild harvested sustainably (“Açaí”).
 Aguaje could be the next açaí. The 
aguaje palm is already prolific and distributed 
throughout the Amazon basin. A single tree 
can produce over 10,000 fruits a year, and its 
pulpy orange flesh is rich in phytoestrogens, 
vitamins, and minerals. Harnessing the 
potential of aguaje and other NTFPs could 
provide a valuable alternative to communities 
that now rely on subsistence farming but only 
if the industries are developed with social and 
environmental responsibility in mind. 
Overcoming Obstacles 
 Currently in the aguaje industry, most 
of the profits benefit intermediaries who 
sell the fruits in Iquitos rather than the 
harvesters themselves (Penn and Neise). In 
Brazil, similar problems were remedied when 
households adopted trade partnerships for 
NTFP commercialization (Morsello et al.). 
 Another problem is that much aguaje 
harvesting is done in an unsustainable way. 
Because aguaje palms grow tall and straight, 
the trees are often cut down to access the 
fruit at the top. In many regions, there is an 
annual “race for aguaje,” where people in the 
Amazon compete to harvest the fruit before 
their neighbors get to it. Thus, every year the 
harvestable trees are farther and farther away 
(Penn and Neise). To prevent communities from 
cutting down primary rainforest trees, there are 
several initiatives to help farmers grow shorter 
aguaje palms on monoculture plantations. 
Although plantations enable farmers to harvest 
aguaje on trees left standing, monoculture 
plantations are prone to diseases, lead to soil 
degradation, and disrupt the surrounding 
ecosystem. For example, although 44 percent 
of the world’s species of birds can be found in 
the Amazon rainforest, less than five percent 
of those species can survive on the oil palm 
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plantations that also replace primary growth 
forest throughout Peru (Srinivas and Koh). 
With the right resources, communities can 
learn to harvest wild aguaje and other NTFPs 
in a sustainable way that eliminates the need 
for domesticated aguaje plantations.
 With the help of partners to provide 
capital and education, communities can 
develop ways to harvest forest products in 
profitable and sustainable ways. For example, 
in the community of Roca Fuerte in the 
central Peruvian Amazon, the Center for 
the Development for an Indigenous Amazon 
(CEDIA) has hosted workshops to teach a new 
method of harvesting wild aguaje without 
cutting down the palms. The technique enables 
a harvester to quickly climb aguaje trees and 
harvest the fruit in just 30 minutes per tree. To 
promote this method of sustainable harvesting, 
Roca Fuerte starting declaring nearby regions 
protected areas, prohibiting the destruction 
of aguaje trees. Every month, policy enforcers 
visit the areas to check on the health of the 
community and forest (Manzi and Coomes). 
Although harvesting NTFPs can provide a 
viable alternative to subsistence farming, the 
harvesting must be done on a limited scale 
so that the flora of the forest can regenerate. 
As the industry expands, it is essential to 
verify that companies are buying NTFPs only 
from sellers who are following regulations to 
harvest sustainably. Because the NTFP harvest 
is limited in scale and requires high shipping 
costs, many companies have been deterred by 
the high prices of wild-sourced goods. There 
are several options to improve the economic 
viability of an expanded NTFP industry. 
 The first key factor in increasing the 
potential of the industry is creating ways for 
NTFPs to be processed locally. Like the quickly 
perishing açaí berry that did not achieve 
popularity until it was discovered that it 
could be locally processed into a frozen pulp, 
many other NTFPs cannot reach high-paying 
markets without similar processing. Some 
companies are already taking advantage of 
strategic processing facilities. The Peruvian 
beer company Backus, for instance, owns a 
floating processing plant to pulp and freeze the 
flavorful camu camu berry to use in beverages. 
With this mobile plant, the company can 
reach remote areas of the jungle via rivers and 
maintain a high-quality harvest (Panduro and 
de Jong, p. 270). Although large companies 
like Backus have been successful, the expense 
of shipping the frozen pulp prevents many 
markets from accessing NTFPs. 
 Thus, investors and others interested in 
alternative development should explore ways 
to process NTFPs that result in lower shipping 
costs. Rather than pulping and freezing fruits, 
for instance, companies might invest in drying 
or aseptic3 packaging plants. Dried fruit has 
a higher value per weight—Peru can look to 
Honduras for a dried fruit success story. There, 
village-level drying facilities each produce more 
than ten tons of dried fruit per season, last for 
ten years, and cost only $5,000 to $10,000 to 
build. Aseptic processing plants are another 
excellent option. Aseptic processing creates 
shelf-stable fruit concentrates. Like drying, 
this method produces products with less water 
weight that do not require freezing. Moreover, 
like freezing and pulping facilities, aseptic 
processing plants can be mounted onto barges 
and floated to sources of fruit in remote areas. 
Because many forest fruits have short, intense 
seasons, floating aseptic processing plants can 
sail along the many Amazonian rivers, working 
with local people to harvest and process the in-
season NTFPs (Clay and Clement).
 Another way companies can increase the 
potential of the NTFP industry is by taking the 
natural sugar percentage of fruits into greater 
consideration. Currently, most Amazonian 
forest fruits are chosen for their strong, unique 
flavors that can be diluted when they reach 
their destination. Instead, some researchers 
suggest that it makes more sense to prioritize 
the sugar concentration of fruits. Choosing 
fruits with high sugar concentrations would 
save time and money because a higher 
sugar concentration means less water in the 
resulting pulp. Thus, the overall weight is 
reduced and the product is less expensive to 
ship. As the authors suggesting this method 
put it, “It makes no sense to ship frozen water 
halfway around the world” (Clay and Clement). 
By studying ways to optimize NTFP processing 
 3Aseptic processing methods expose a product to a quick 
burst of heat to minimize the chance of contamination 
from microorganisms. 
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and minimize shipping costs, investors can 
benefit immensely from the wealth of naturally 
occurring products in the jungle. By working 
with rainforest populations to harvest these 
goods sustainably, the NTFP industry can 
one day eliminate reliance on slash-and-burn 
agriculture. 
Conclusion
 Peru’s rainforest ecosystem and the 
communities that depend on it have much 
to gain if industries in the Amazon can be 
developed in a sustainable way. The two key 
factors in promoting sustainable development 
in Peruvian Amazonia involve clarifying 
national policies and developing alternative 
industries to equitably benefit Amazonian 
communities. Government sectors and 
subnational governments should coordinate 
their efforts to create a common vision about 
the value of the rainforest. Then, Peru can create 
a unified legislative procedure for determining 
land use that moderates the needs of all relevant 
interest groups and finish land classification as 
soon as possible. When allocating resources 
to subnational governments, Peru should 
emphasize training programs so that regional 
and local governments have adequate technical 
capability to take advantage of those resources. 
In this way, the country can ensure that new 
legislation will be implemented. The aim of 
such a political environment is to minimize 
further development projects that segment 
primary forest and open it to deforestation 
from slash-and-burn agriculture. 
 As Peru relies less on industries implicated 
with deforestation, it will need to help people 
in Amazonian communities develop alternative 
ways to make a living. For instance, in the 
lowland river basin of Loreto, where slash-and-
burn agriculture is especially prevalent, public 
and private interests could partner with local 
communities to sustainably harvest NTFPs 
and process them locally, thereby minimizing 
shipping costs, whether by implementing new 
types of processing or by using new criteria 
for choosing which NTFPs to process. By 
creating a collective wisdom about the value 
of the rainforest and sustainable alternatives 
to deforesting industries, Peruvians can utilize 
rainforest resources without sacrificing the 
jungle on which they depend. Sustainable 
development of the Amazon rainforest is 
essential for improving the lives of jungle 
communities now and saving the rainforest for 
generations to come.
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